The basis of Chalmer’s position on consciousness relies on physicalism being abandoned and deemed false in order to create a science of consciousness. Like physical science, some phenomena involved in the explanation of experience and its relation to consciousness must be taken as fundamental. Chalmers defends his claim of physicalism being false by stating that unlike fundamental scientific claims, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states nor can they be explained in simpler terms (Chalmers 434). Chalmers creates this argument by stating that consciousness exists in absence of physicalism, “easy” and “hard” problems of consciousness exist, and an explanatory gap exists to separate physical and mental explanations of concepts (Chalmers 431). For example, science can explain that H2O is the chemical formula of water, but it cannot explain the experience of what it is like to experience being water. Chalmers says that consciousness is something quite difficult to explain, but in his writing he will give an account as to why it is so difficult to explain (Chalmers 431). His reasoning is built up by his thought experiment and the rift between mental and physical qualia, and Chalmers attempts to defend that consciousness acts as a fundamental given aspect in the universe which combines experience and law, what he calls naturalistic dualism (Chalmers 438). Chalmers’ basic thesis of “naturalistic dualism” involves the existence of both physical and nonphysical phenomena in the natural world. Consciousness is part of the nonphysical side of the universe, and scientific fundamentals involve the physical aspect of the universe. Chalmers begins his argument for his position on consciousness by introducing the easy problems of the theory of consciousness as scientific, including the ability to discriminate and categorize environmental stimuli, the integration of information, the difference between wakefulness and sleep, the ability to report and access mental states, and the deliberate ability to control behavior (Chalmers 432). However, the main problem with explaining consciousness is what he calls the hard problem. He spends the rest of his essay explaining the issues involved with the complexity of this hard problem, which he defines as the problem of experience (Chalmers 432-433). By comparing the easy problem with the hard problem, it is clear to see the issue between the easy type of problems and the hard problem.Unlike the easy problem which states that consciousness is reliant on neurophysical mechanisms and physical reactions as a result of stimulus, the hard problem is not so easily explained by scientific processes (Chalmers 432). Chalmers defends his position on the hard problem of consciousness by describing the hard problem as going beyond physical explanation of the performance of functions. An example he uses is the concept of gene transmission. He states that a gene carries out a task of transmitting DNA, but to say that ‘gene’ isn’t definable is incorrect. It can be defined as the entity which performs the transmission and storage process, an easily definable object (Chambers 434). Chalmers disputes that reductive explanations like in this gene argument can be used to describe natural scientific phenomena, but this argument process cannot be used for the problem of consciousness. This is, in short, what he describes as the hard problem. The scientific methods of explaining physical experience are not sufficient in explaining conscious experience. An example of this is explaining the performance of functions like DNA (Chalmers 433,435). Consciousness according to Chalmers is not simply a cognitive phenomena such as memory or language that can hold relevance or be easily characterized in functionality. Consciousness is not only the physical explanation of what, it is the explanation of why macroscopic structure and dynamics are associated with consciousness (Chalmers 436). Some things must be taken as fundamental. The mind is not just a physical mass of a brain and physical body, but it is composed of mental properties which conjoin to produce experience (Chalmers 438). Chalmers says we sometimes say that consciousness is equal to being awake, but that is not the case (Chalmers 432). He elaborates more on this theory of neurophysical aspects perhaps being a necessary condition for thinking but not being sufficient for thinking with his thought experiment regarding the existence of philosophical zombies. Philosophical zombies are represented as atom-for-atom replicas of our bodies down to the very last detail that act just as we do, despite not having conscious minds (Chalmers 435). Due to the lack of understanding of consciousness, the existence of these philosophical zombies is conceivable. Although these philosophical zombies look and behave just as their conscious counterparts, their physical likeness is not sufficient for thinking, and not sufficient for the existence of consciousness because mental states cannot be broken down into physical states. Chalmers uses a metaphorical God situation in which God places all physical aspects of the world where they are, then has to add in the conscious aspects of life after the fact (Chalmers 436). I agree with his use of the explanatory gap in order to justify the realization that the separation of physical and conscious aspects is understandable and agreeable due to the ability to distinguish scientific explanations from conscious experience. Following this information, there needs to be a way to connect physical and metaphysical concepts, and these entities don’t contradict, rather they need to be connected to each other. When Chalmers says pessimism involved with giving up on the theory of consciousness is premature, I agree, and it is not able to simplified like the scientific processes of physics (Chalmers 437). There are nonphysical features at play, and realizing this allows for the construction of a theory of consciousness. In his thought experiment, although it is a conceivable concept to think about a similar “zombie” that acts as I do, it is an odd viewpoint to not assign this similar living being any mental states. I further agree with Chalmers’ position on consciousness because experiences are registered and reproduced in both mental and physical realms, however, scientific data is a physical state, while qualia is a mental property of consciousness unable to be explained fully within this scientific physical realm. Although there is a hard problem with defining consciousness, Chalmers suggests that consciousness is a combination of experience and theoretical phenomena, not simply a problem to be explained by physicalism.