The CPEC is part of China’ efforts meant to

  The CPEC is part of China’ efforts meant to strengthen its trade and commerce connectivity with variegated regions of world. In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized reviving the warmed-over trade routes connecting China, Inside Asia and Europe through developing three main corridors through southern, inside and northern Xinjiang, which connect China with Russia, Europe and Pakistan (Jia, 2014). Also, the Chinese have recently increased focus on the Bangladesh-China-India Myanmar corridor that would provide China’s landlocked Yunnan province wangle to the Bay of Bengal (Chowdhury, 2013). While China’s prime focus in constructing theses corridors seems to strengthen its trade and economic connectivity with countries in the region and vastitude primarily to fulfill its soaring energy needs and enhance exports, it is expected that Pakistan could sally as a hub of commerce and trade in the region with the construction of the CPEC that would entail establishing several economic and industrial zones and physical road and railway links connecting Pakistan and China. As the corridor moreover anticipates having regional connectivity with India and Afghanistan–although it is still too early to scuttlebutt whether regional element of the CPEC will wilt operational or not–it could moreover enhance regional economic and trade cooperation, that in turn would contribute towards regional peace and stability. Gwadar holds inside place in the utility of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor considering without making the Gwadar Port fully functional, it would be difficult for China to see the predictable corridor as an energy corridor that appears as one of its main objectives overdue the construction of the CPEC. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, which channels well-nigh one third of the world’s oil trade, Gwadar could play a key role in ensuring China’s energy security as it provides a much shorter route than the current 12,900km route from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca to China’s eastern seaboard (Chowdhury, 2014). However, there is the view that the construction of the CPEC will ‘place Gwadar on the matrix of intense geo-strategic competition’ (CPGS, 2014). It has been said that Gwadar will moreover put China and Pakistan in a strategically worthwhile position withal the Arabian Sea compounding once existing Indian concerns that stem from ‘China’s involvement in nearby ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar and Chittagong in Bangladesh’ (Chowdhury, 2014). One the other hand as India is moreover energy hungry it looks forwards to developing Iran’s Chabahar Port. In October 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet decided to develop Chabahar Port, which many believe is inside for India to unshut up a route to landlocked Afghanistan, where it has ripened tropical security ties and economic interests (Dawn, 2014a), and to have wangle to energy-rich Inside Asian States. While Gwadar is located in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where a nationalist insurgency is rife, Chabahar is located in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan where unrest prevails as well mainly due to unrepealable violent Sunni sectarian-nationalist groups operating in the district. If peace and stability is not achieved in Afghanistan without the drawdown of international assistance forces, and countries in the region, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor mainly India, Pakistan and Iran, engage in proxy wars, it could have some implications for internal security mainly for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran that could impact minutiae projects. Pakistan has blamed India in the past for supporting Baloch insurgents from Afghan soil. Similarly, Iran has concerns regarding Jundullah–a sectarian insurgent group based and operating in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province with self-ruling cross-border movement into and from Pakistan. But analysts oppose that while Pakistan has struggled to unzip security in Balochistan, Iran has the topics to enforce its writ in Sistan-Baluchistan that suggests Chabahar could wilt functional older than Gwadar, if pursued by India and Iran fervently. Nonetheless, China has devised a pro-active foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern countries by using the United Nations as a platform to negate the ongoing war in the region (CPGS, 2014). As far as Iran is concerned, China wishes to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful political settlement. Moreover, when it comes to ties between Pakistan and India, China has played its part (Ibid). At the same time, for China, Pakistan’s geo-strategic position is very crucial as it serves as a window into the Middle East. Meanwhile, it has once expanded its trade, infrastructure and energy links with most of the Inside Asian Republicans (Pakistan-China Institute, 2014). But insecurity and instability in Afghanistan are a major source of snooping not only for China but moreover other neighboring countries including Pakistan, India and Iran. China is once the biggest economic investor in Afghanistan with well-nigh $7.5 billion investment (Ibid). China has recently enhanced bilateral and trilateral efforts aimed at strengthening regional cooperation and coordination. It hosted the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Beijing on October 31, 2014 with a view to promote security and stability in the Afghanistan, in cooperation with its neighbors (Arif, 2014). China has moreover pushed the matter of Afghanistan’s future without the drawdown withdrawal to the top of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s voucher (Pakistan-China Institute, 2014). undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined undefined