Confusion believed Austria-Hungary would automatically send most of its

Confusion between the Central PowersThe Central Power’s plan was effected greatly with mis-communication. Germany made promise with Austria-Hungary’s to support its intrusion of Serbia, but perception of what this meant differed greatly. Previously tested plans for deployment were replaced earlier in 1914, but they were not yet tested in real life. Austro-Hungarian thought their northern side would be protected by Germans from Russia. Germans, whereas, believed Austria-Hungary would automatically send most of its army against Russia, in the mean time Germans will take care of France. This ultimately lead to the Austria-Hungary to divide its army forces between the Serbia and Russia’s front.Serbian campaignAustria invaded the Serbia and fought with its army the Battles of Cer and Kolubara on 12th of August. But in the coming week Austrian suffered with great loss, which resulted in the marking of the first big Allied victories of the war and crushed the hopes of Austria-Hungary of an easy defeat of Serbia . Thus, Austria kept proper amount of forces over the Serbian side, as a result its struggle against Russia wakened. And this victory of Serbia’s against the Austro-Hungarian intrusion in 1914 has been known as one of the major upset victories of 20th century.German forces in Belgium and FranceAs the occurance of WWI happened, approximately 80% of the total army of Germany was deployed as 7 field armies on west front according to the plan called Aufmarsch II West. But later on, these were reassigned to follow the deployment plan known as Schlieffen Plan , sometimes refereed to as the Aufmarsch I West. According to this strategy Germans will march through the north of Belgium and then into the France, in an attempt to surround the army of France and then enter the fortresses of Verdun’s second defensive area then the Paris and then the river Marne.Aufmarsch I West was the one convenient to the Germans out of the 4 total deployment plans at the time. Each plan had certain advantageous output, but they had no idea how to actually execute any one of these plans, resulting in commanding officers carrying them out as their own initiative, with minimum omission. Plan Aufmarsch I West, was designed in a way to have one-front war with the French army, after trying it once it eventually became clear that in the end it was irrelevant to the wars, Germany could expect to face; Russia and Britain both of them were expected to help out the French army, whereas there was zero possibility of availability of troops of Italy or Austria-Hungary for operations adjacent to France. But ultimately it was able to retain a certain charm due to its nature and the pessimism of pre-war thinking. Thus, for the offensive of 1914, the Aufmarsch II West deployment was changed. Moltke observed Schlieffen’s plan, changing the deployment of the army on western side by decreasing the wing from 85% to 70% the one that had to enter through the Belgium. At last, the Schlieffen plan was drastically changed by Moltke, thus it was also called as the Moltke Plan.The plan called for the right wing of Germans to move to bypass the armies of France concentrated on France-German border, then defeating the France forces near the Luxembourg and Belgium and afterwards moving towards south to the Paris.